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The Soviet Diplomatic Corps and 
Stalin’s Purges
ALASTAIR KOCHO-WILLIAMS
In the 1930s, Soviet diplomats needed to address new challenges that 
Stalinism brought, both domestically and internationally. This was 
particularly the case during the purge era in the second half of the 
decade when diplomats were faced with the diffi culties of representing 
a regime which had unleashed terror on its people, as well as having 
to deal with the fear that they too might perish in the purges. Soviet 
diplomats were stretched in new ways by fear and had the task of limi-
ting the damage the purges caused to the Soviet Union’s diplomatic 
efforts. At the same time, the purges hampered the Narkomindel 
(Narodnyi komissariat inostrannykh del — Peoples’ Commissariat for 
Foreign Affairs) as it was allowed less scope to formulate foreign policy, 
and the regime withdrew diplomats and diplomatic apparatus from 
international society. Ultimately the purges decimated the Narkomin-
del, rendering it impotent, with talented diplomats replaced by a new 
wave of offi cials far less capable than their predecessors and unable to 
act independently of Stalin and Molotov.
This article considers the effects of the purges on diplomats and on 
Soviet diplomacy. Some elements of this have been dealt with in previ-
ous works on the Narkomindel, notably those of Teddy Uldricks and 
Sabine Dullin.1 These have looked at the purge of the Narkomindel 
and its impact on structure and staffi ng, particularly with a view to the 
creation of a Narkomindel fi rmly under Stalin’s control. The current 
article adds new dimensions to these works, in particular dealing with 
how the Foreign Commissar Maksim Maksimovich Litvinov and the 
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1 The main works that consider the purge of the Narkomindel are Teddy J. Uldricks, 
‘The Impact of the Great Purges on the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs’, 
Slavic Review, 36, 1977, 2, pp. 187–203 (hereafter, ‘The Impact of the Great Purges’), and 
Diplomacy and Ideology: The Origins of Soviet Foreign Relations, 1917–1930, London, 1979 (hereafter, 
Diplomacy and Ideology); Sabine Dullin, ‘Litvinov and the People’s Commissariat of Foreign 
Affairs: The Fate of an Administration under Stalin, 1930–39’, in Silvio Pons and Andrea 
Romano (eds), Russia in the Age of Wars, 1914–1945, Milan, 2000, pp. 137–38 (hereafter, 
‘Litvinov and the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs’); ead., Des hommes d’infl uence: 
les ambassadeurs de Staline en Europe, 1930–1939, Paris, 2001 (hereafter, Des hommes d’infl uence); 
ead., ‘Sovetskie diplomati v epoku stalinskikh represii. Novie lyudi?’, Neprikosnovenyi zapas, 4, 
2002, 24, pp. 42–48, and ead., ‘Une diplomatie plébéienne? Profi ls et compétences des 
diplomates soviétiques, 1936–1945’, Cahiers du monde russe, 44, 2003, 2–3, pp. 437–64.
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Soviet diplomats serving under him responded to the purges, what 
their opinions of them were, and how they dealt with the challenge of 
explaining the purges to observers abroad, as well as examining the 
numbers that perished, what they were accused of, why the Narkomin-
del was so vulnerable to the purges, how the Narkomindel struggled to 
function effectively during a diffi cult time in Soviet foreign relations 
and how the regime achieved a withdrawal from international affairs. 
What is provided here is a case study of a commissariat and its 
members during Stalin’s purges. The situation of the Narkomindel 
cannot be considered to be typical of the process of the purges in their 
wider context, nor can it necessarily be seen as indicative of the ways 
in which the purge swept through Soviet agencies. Indeed, the Narko-
mindel was somewhat atypical during the purges, in part because 
of the international prominence of diplomats, and thus we cannot take 
the number of individuals purged as an indicator of the extent of 
the purge of certain sectors of society. As such, this article does not 
attempt to answer the broad questions of the rationale for the purges, 
but rather addresses their effect on the Soviet Union’s diplomats in 
carrying out their duties, as they were obliged to comply with the rules 
of Stalinist and diplomatic society. In this respect, the current article 
differs from previous work on the fate of the Narkomindel during 
the purges by focusing on the way in which diplomats responded to 
the pressures of the time, considering the implications for Soviet 
diplomacy towards the end of the 1930s. 
In order to make some sense of the purge of the Narkomindel it 
needs to be considered, at least in part, as a means for the regime to 
restrict the Narkomindel in the conduct of Soviet international affairs 
in the second half of the 1930s, which hampered diplomats’ abilities to 
carry out their duties and led to serious changes in Soviet diplomacy 
by 1939. In the fi rst half of the 1930s Litvinov had gone to great lengths 
to create an agency staffed with offi cials who were able to function on 
their own initiative.2 It would seem, as the 1930s went on and paranoia 
increased, that this was seen as problematic by the regime, and so there 
was a desire to limit the freedom that the Narkomindel and its diplo-
mats had gained. The beginning of this was a process of withdrawal of 
the diplomatic apparatus and, with it, the potential for supposed harm 
caused through it by contact with foreigners. In the second half of 
the 1930s, the Soviet Union began a programme of foreign consular 
closure within its borders, coupled with the closure of some of its own 
2 Ivan Maiskii typifi ed Litvinov’s management of the Narkomindel as that of a factory 
overseer. Ivan Maiskii, Vospominaniia sovetskogo posla, Moscow, 1964, 2 vols, 1, p. 138; id., 
Before the Storm: Recollections, London, 1944, p. 18; Arthur Pope, Maxim Litvinoff, New York, 
1943, p. 147.
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consulates overseas. This seems to have been motivated by the Terror 
following Sergei Kirov’s murder in December 1934.3 Kirov’s murder 
was used by Stalin to promote a threat of counter-revolutionary ele-
ments acting within the Soviet Union that needed to be rooted out. 
The regime sought out class enemies, those guilty of hampering the 
Soviet Union’s economic development, dissidents and spies. Many of 
those accused in the latter categories were foreign, making them even 
more suspect. There was also a concern, as the Terror progressed, to 
restrict the international visibility of the process. In an era of spy scares, 
the general distrust of foreigners that arose during the Terror only 
served to further the policy of closing consulates. Claimed as an added 
dimension was the desire to put the Soviet Union on an equal footing 
with other powers by having the same number of consulates abroad as 
foreign powers had within the Soviet Union.4
The closures began in February 1936 with the Consulate General in 
Mukden, China, which was deemed unnecessary. There was a respite 
until August 1937 when two consulates in Manchukuo were closed, 
followed by a demand a month later that Japan close its consulates in 
Odessa and Novosibirsk. During the summer and autumn of 1937, the 
Soviet Union demanded the closure of fourteen consulates, with further 
demands in early 1938 that Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey and Czechos-
lovakia close theirs. Others had already been closed by Germany and 
Italy.5 This was a programme ordered from above, although it is clear 
that some diplomats supported the move. On 28 January 1938, closure 
of the British Consulate in Leningrad was discussed in the Polit buro, 
following notes from Vladimir Petrovich Potemkin advising that such 
action be taken. On 27 March 1938, the Politburo decided to liquidate 
the embassy in Vienna, further stressing that it would not be replaced 
with a consulate. On 23 March 1939, it ordered the closure of the 
Prague embassy, to be changed to a Consulate-General.6 While these 
3 Kirov’s murder is widely viewed as the event that sparked the terror in the Soviet 
Union. It remains a matter of debate as to whether Stalin played a role in Kirov’s death, 
or whether he just used it as a pretext to launch a programme of rooting out ‘enemies of 
the people’.
4 Henderson to Secretary of State, 361.00/12, 14 May 1937, in United States Department 
of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, Washington, D.C., 
1933–1939 (hereafter FRUS: Soviet Union, 1933–1939), pp. 374–76; Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki 
SSSR (hereafter, DVP SSSR), Moscow, 21 vols, 1957–77, p. 718, as quoted in Jonathan 
Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security, Birmingham, 1984, pp. 154–55.
5 Eugene Magerovsky, ‘The People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, 1917–1946’, 
unpublished PhD thesis, Columbia University, New York, 1975, p. 337.
6 Politburo Protocol no. 57, 28 January 1938, Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial´no-
politicheskoi istorii (hereafter, RGASPI), f. 17, op. 162, d. 22, l. 113, reproduced in G. 
M. Adibekov (ed.), Politbiuro TsK RKP(b)-VKP(b) i Evropa: resheniia ‘osoboi papki,’ 1923–1939, 
Moscow, 2001, p. 358; Politburo Protocol no. 59, 27 March 1938, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, 
d. 22, l. 159, reproduced in ibid., p. 359; Politburo Protocol no. 1, 23 March 1939, 
RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 25, l. 1, reproduced in ibid., p. 370.
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steps were likely related to the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 and 
Germany’s annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland in 1938, from 
the point of view of diplomats it was problematic. In particular Foreign 
Commissar Litvinov saw this process as damaging to Soviet prestige, 
in terms of closing the borders, but also because it went against all of 
the concessions the Narkomindel had worked so hard to achieve. From 
the point of view of diplomacy, these moves by the Politburo were 
offensive to the nations with which the Soviet Union had succeeded in 
establishing a dialogue. 
These problems extended even to foreign diplomats. Along with the 
closure of the consulates and resultant problems for foreigners in recei-
ving visas, issues arose with receiving foreign diplomats in the Soviet 
Union. Litvinov handled these situations with caution, and requested 
permission from the Central Committee for such visits.7 Soviet diplo-
mats had been deeply aggrieved in the 1920s by the lack of extension 
of the basic courtesies for diplomats, such as allowing them to enter 
countries and to be afforded immunity from customs searches.8 From 
his personal understanding of the issue, Litvinov was displeased that 
the paranoia of the purge era forced the infl iction of such diplomatic 
discourtesies on others, and he feared the potential repercussions for 
the Soviet Union’s diplomatic relations.
These matters placed serious limitations on foreign diplomats work-
ing within the Soviet Union. By the end of 1938, the foreign diplo-
matic community was restricted to Moscow, and the NKVD did its 
best to isolate foreign diplomats from the Soviet people.9 The Soviet 
Union adopted a policy of containment in order to keep its citizens 
away from contact with foreigners and to prevent foreign surveillance 
of the Soviet Union. The restrictions on diplomats and their move-
ments ran counter to accepted norms of diplomacy, and must be seen 
as further evidence of the harm that the purges and their surrounding 
paranoia were doing to Soviet diplomatic prestige.
Closing consulates and effectively withdrawing from this aspect of 
international relations impacted heavily on how the Narkomindel could 
go about its business. That such a withdrawal was the precise opposite 
to the intentions of Soviet diplomats at the time is striking, and 
7 Politburo Protocol no. 67, 18 January 1939, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 24, l. 85, 
reproduced in ibid., p. 368.
8 Letter from Maksim Litvinov to Rex Leeper 3 April 1918, Arkhiv vneshnei politiki 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii (hereafter, AVP RF), f. 04, op. 4, d. 234, p. 16, l. 23; Telegram from 
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Chicherin no. 285/1068, December 1918, AVP RF, 
f. 140, op. 2, p. 1, d. 1, l. 13; Alastair Kocho-Williams, ‘The Culture of Russian and 
Soviet Diplomacy, Lamsdorf to Litvinov, 1900–1939,’ unpublished PhD thesis, University 
of Manchester, Manchester, 2006 (hereafter, ‘The Culture of Russian and Soviet 
Diplomacy’), pp. 102–03.
9 Nora Murray, I Spied for Stalin, New York, 1951 (hereafter, I Spied for Stalin), p. 65.
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demonstrates the power that Stalin had over the Narkomindel. The 
regime, however, did not stop with closing consulates as part of the 
withdrawal of the Soviet Union from international affairs, as it also 
turned to purging the Narkomindel and its diplomats.
Following the Bukharin trial in March 1938, it was rumoured 
that there would be a ‘special trial of diplomats’.10 The trial never 
happened, but the Narkomindel was unable to escape the purges that 
ravaged the party in the late 1930s. Diplomats were recalled and shot, 
or else killed trying to escape the clutches of the NKVD.11 The purge 
of the Narkomindel was, like the closure of the consulates, in part born 
out of the paranoia that those who had had contact with foreigners had 
turned against the Soviet Union. With the rash of spy scares accom-
panying the purges, Soviet diplomats with their foreign contacts becam e 
natural suspects for such activity. The purge of the Narkomindel had 
much to do with the contacts that Soviet diplomats had established 
during their service abroad, and policies developed during the purges 
show steps to limit the contact diplomats had with the outside world. 
In February 1938, there was a move to have all ambassadors serving 
in Europe and Asia return to Moscow for six weeks every six months, 
and those in Japan, the US and China every eight months.12 There 
was a palpable aura of distrust, and this was only heightened by those 
who had contacts overseas. Accusations of foreign espionage and inter-
national Trotskyism led to diplomats being arrested as enemies of the 
people.13 Much of the suspicion was based upon diplomats’ contact 
with foreigners, in itself frequently damning enough, although charges 
were often trumped up to make crimes appear worse. At the beginning 
of the purge of the Narkomindel, Stern had been arrested in Berlin as 
a Gestapo agent. In Spain the Soviet Embassy was ravaged in late 1937 
and early 1938, as almost the entirety of its staff was accused of col-
laborating with Franco’s regime, at a time when the Communists 
were struggling in the Spanish Civil War. All this highlights the Soviet 
regime’s paranoia and creation of scapegoats and enemies, with 
10 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment, London, 1993, p. 423.
11 Aleksandr Barmin, Memoirs of a Soviet Diplomat: Twenty Years in the Service of the U.S.S.R, 
London, 1938 (hereafter, Memoirs), pp. 16–17, 23–24.
12 Politburo decision, 28 February 1938, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 996, as quoted in Dullin 
‘Litvinov and the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs’, pp. 137–38.
13 Arosev to Khrushchev, 22 March 1937, Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
(hereafter, GARF), f. 5283, op. 1a, d. 342, ll. 41–48, as quoted in Michael David-Fox, 
‘Sta linist Westerniser? Aleksandr Arosev’s Literary and Political Depictions of Europe’, 
Slavic Review, 62, 2003, 4, p. 757; Smirnov to Andreev, 22 March 1938, GARF, f.  5283, 
op.  2a, d.  1, ll.  1–5 as quoted in ibid., p.  757. Arosev had served as attaché in Latvia (1921–
22), France (1924–25), Sweden (1926–27), Lithuania (1927–28) and Czechoslovakia (1928–33) 
before becoming head of the All-Union Society for Cultural Ties Abroad (VOKS) between 
1934 and 1937.
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parti cular emphasis on the supposed threat from outsiders and the 
resulting effect on the Narkomindel.14 
This was problematic for diplomats in the purge era since, by the 
very nature of their profession, having had contact with foreign socie-
ties, they were seen to have been at least partially seduced by capitalist 
decadence. In Solzhenitsyn’s novel The First Circle, the diplomat Inno-
kenty Volodin is arrested amidst the typical trappings of capitalism 
— jazz, fi ne wines and licentious women.15 The label ‘cosmopolitan’ 
was applied to diplomats as a pejorative term that implied a person was 
engaged in espionage.16 Litvinov was frequently labelled an anglophile, 
largely due to the time he spent as an émigré in London and because 
his wife was English. The regime launched an assault on individuals 
engaged in foreign relations over their interests and connections to the 
world outside the Soviet Union, which can only point to a fear of the 
cultural contamination of its diplomats as a result of their contact with 
foreigners and non-Soviet ideas. 
Regarding contacts with foreigners, there is an almost complete 
rever sal of what were nominally the principles of Soviet diplomacy. 
The purge era brought a return to Soviet diplomatic isolation, this time 
self-imposed as a result of the state’s withdrawal from international 
society. The Soviet Union closed consulates in order to limit contact 
with the outside world, and the loss of diplomats serving overseas fur-
ther contributed to this, returning the diplomatic body to the state in 
which it had been between the Revolution and the Genoa Conference, 
paralysed by an inability to function in the diplomatic world.17 In the 
14 Barmin, Memoirs, pp. 16–17; Central Committee of the Soviet Union, Opredelenie 
4k-I4849/55, personal papers in Valentina Vasilevskaia’s (Jan Antonovich Berzin’s grand-
daughter) possession. Maria Berzin, ‘Commentary on the “delo” of Jan Antonovich Berzin’, 
personal papers in Vasilevskaia’s possession, p. 2.
15 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The First Circle, London, 1968, p. 91. Catriona Kelly discusses 
the work in her Refi ning Russia: Advice Literature, Polite Culture, and Gender from Catherine to 
Yeltsin, Oxford, 2001, p. 231.
16 ‘Cosmopolitan’ was frequently applied to Jews in Russia, from tsarist times when 
pogroms had been carried out against them, and had associations with Zionism. During 
the New Economic Policy (NEP) era there had been an association of Jews with the amas-
sing of wealth and there was a return to the use of it in the Soviet Union during the latter 
part of Stalin’s reign as ‘bezrodnyi kosmopolit’ (rootless cosmopolitan). That Litvinov 
and a number of senior diplomats were Jewish should be noted. There is a secondary 
sense, following the Second World War, that ‘cosmopolitans’ believed that some aspect of 
Western technology or society was superior to Soviet and an implication of involvement in 
espionage.
17 Following the Russian Revolution the Soviet Union had found itself in a state of 
diplomatic isolation. To some extent this was imposed by foreign powers, who continued 
to support diplomats from the former regime, but was also a result of the Soviet adoption 
of diplomacy as another means to further revolution. This isolation was effectively ended 
following the Genoa Conference in 1922. For further details, see Kocho-Williams, 
‘The Culture of Russian and Soviet Diplomacy’; Uldricks, Diplomacy and Ideology; James D. 
Armstrong, ‘The Diplomacy of Revolutionary States’, in Jan Melissen (ed.), Innovation in 
Diplomatic Practice, Basingstoke, 1999 (hereafter, ‘The Diplomacy of Revolutionary States’); 
id., Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society, Oxford, 1993.
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light of the debate regarding the ‘Great Retreat’ from socialism and 
its international aspect, the limiting of diplomatic apparatus was one 
possible means of ensuring that the Soviet Union became more intro-
verted, and its citizens less able to have contact with the outside world. 
Although this time the isolation was caused by the purges rather than 
by foreign powers, the net result was much the same and it is clear that 
the domestic politics of terror held the Soviet Union’s foreign service 
in limbo.18
The NKVD directed the purge of the Narkomindel from within. 
This was not the fi rst instance of secret police monitoring diplomats: 
the NKVD (and its forerunners) was already involved in policing the 
Narkomindel and in rooting out individuals who were not adhering to 
the prescribed line.19 Most important in the purges, however, was the 
NKVD’s direct involvement in the Narkomindel’s personnel depart-
ment. In 1937 Vasilii Korzhenko, an NKVD agent, took charge of 
the department in order to direct the purge.20 Korzhenko policed 
the entire institution, from the cipher clerks to the most senior ambas-
sadors, watching for any deviation from the party line.21 Additionally, 
the Narko mindel passed lists regarding its personnel to the NKVD, 
at times denouncing offi cials, thereby abetting the purge.22 The same 
was true of the Comintern, for whom involvement with foreigners 
was a similar issue. Both the Narkomindel and the Comintern were at 
times directly instructed by the Politburo to engage in such list-making, 
but more frequently acted on their own initiative to demonstrate 
their vigi lance in rooting out potentially dangerous individuals from 
18 Nicholas Timasheff, The Great Retreat: The Growth and Decline of Communism in Russia, 
New York, 1946; David Hoffmann, ‘Was There a “Great Retreat” from Soviet Socialism? 
Stalinist Culture Reconsidered’, Kritika, 5, 2004, 4, pp. 651–74.
19 Vladimir Sokolov, ‘Poslednaia sluzhebnaia zapiska G. V. Chicherina’, Arkhiv Prezi-
denta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, f. 48, op. 1, d. 66, ll. 38–71, reproduced in Istochnik, 6, 1995 
(hereafter, ‘Poslednaia sluzhebnaia zapiska G. V. Chicherina’), p. 108; id., ‘Neisvestnyi 
G. V. Chicherin: iz rassekrechennykh arkhivov MID RF’, Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, 1994, 
vol. 2, pp. 105–15; Grigory Besedovsky, Revelations of a Soviet Diplomat, London, 1931, p. 69; 
Viktor Suvorov, Aquarium: The Career and Defection of a Soviet Military Spy, London, 1985, 
p. 121; Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert, The Diplomats: 1919–1939, Princeton, NJ, 1953 (here-
after, The Diplomats), p. 255n; Walter Krivitsky, In Stalin’s Secret Service, New York, 2000, 
p. 38; ‘Gingering up by the Cheka’, and ‘True Communists’, 18 August 1925, Morning Post, 
in Obzor Angliskoi pressy, Svodka no. 10, AVP RF, f. 69, op. 13, p. 42, d. 42, l. 11; Kocho-
Williams, ‘The Culture of Russian and Soviet Diplomacy’, pp. 152–53.
20 Barmin, Memoirs, p. 17.
21 Murray, I Spied for Stalin, p. 83.
22 Politburo Protocol no. 68, 2–28 February 1939, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 24, l. 104, 
reproduced in Grant Adibekov, Kiril Anderson and Kiril Shirinia (eds), Politbiuro TsK 
RKP(b)-VKP(b) i Komintern: 1919–1943: dokumenty, Moscow, 2004, p. 772.
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their organi zations.23 Complicity with the purges, and indeed in some 
respects helping their course, was almost unavoidable.
Litvinov, while publicly obliged to acknowledge those members of 
the Narkomindel who disappeared as guilty of being traitors, was 
clearly displeased by the effect that the purges had on the Narko mindel 
in the late 1930s.24 In a letter of 3 January 1939 addressed to Stalin, 
Litvinov expressed his displeasure and frustration, setting out what the 
purges had done to the staffi ng and effectiveness of the Narko mindel. 
The letter is a clear indictment not just of the purge within the Nar-
komindel, but of Stalin’s lack of understanding of diplomatic courtesy. 
Litvinov appealed to Stalin in the letter about the harm that was being 
done to the Narkomindel, effectively demonstrating that Soviet diplo-
macy was being moulded in the period by the actions of Stalin, rather 
than by the diplomats as they would have desired. The letter clearly 
shows Litvinov’s protests and his readiness to stand up to Stalin in 
defence of the Narkomindel and Soviet diplomacy.25
At the time of writing, Litvinov identifi ed nine vacant ambassa dorial 
posts in ‘Washington, Tokyo, Warsaw, Bucharest, Barcelona, Kaunas, 
Copenhagen, Budapest and Sofi a’, and warned of a tenth possible 
vacancy in Tehran if the ambassador was not allowed to return from 
Moscow. In some embassies there had ‘been no ambassador for over 
a year’, and Litvinov warned that this could be interpreted by foreign 
powers as a discourtesy, or at the very least an indicator of insuffi -
ciently cordial relations. Certainly he was concerned that ‘particularly 
embarrassing and harmful for [Soviet] relations [was] the absence 
of an ambassador in Warsaw, Bucharest and Tokyo’. Further to this, 
the vacant posts raised the question of how foreign states and their 
diplomats saw the purges. Empty ambassadorial posts, while harmful 
to Soviet prestige, must surely have implied that the Narkomindel was 
23 A list of Communist Party members ‘formerly in other parties, having Trotskyist and 
Rightist tendencies’ sent by F. Kotelnikov to the NKVD, 4 September 1936, RGASPI, 
f. 546, op. 1, d. 376, ll. 30–36, reproduced in William Chase, Enemies Within the Gates? The 
Comintern and the Stalinist Repression, 1934–39, New Haven, CT and London, 2002, pp.  178–84; 
Denunciations from Walecki to Ezhov, 26 June 1937, RGASPI, f. 495, op. 252, d. 510, ll. 
1–10 reproduced in ibid., pp. 228–32; Lists of arrested former members and candidate 
members of the party organization of the ECCI apparatus, 1939, RGASPI, f. 546, op. 1, 
d. 434, ll. 25–32, reproduced in ibid., pp. 309–18.
24 Report of US Ambassador Davies, 4 March 1937, Joseph Davies Papers, Box 7, Manu-
script Division, US Library of Congress, as quoted in Hugh Phillips, Between the Revolution 
and the West: A Political Biography of Maxim M. Litvinov, Boulder, CO, 1992 (hereafter, Between 
the Revolution and the West), pp. 161–62; Aleksandr Barmin, One Who Survived: The Life Story 
of a Russian Under the Soviets, New York, 1945 (hereafter, One Who Survived), p. 45; Joseph E. 
Davies, Mission to Moscow: A Record of Confi dential Dispatches to the Department of State, Correspon-
dence, Current Diary and Journal Entries Including Notes and Comment up to October 1941, London, 
1942, pp. 167, 262.
25 Letter from Litvinov to Stalin, 3 January 1939, DVP SSSR, vol. 22, book 1, p. 10 
(hereafter, Litvinov to Stalin, 3 January 1939).
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unable to manage its personnel effectively, let alone carry out diplo-
matic negotiations, and was withdrawing from the international 
stage.26
Litvinov was clearly aware that there were not simply problems of 
prestige at play here, but also the extent to which the purges hampered 
diplomats in their duties. As the Soviets had found in the early 1920s 
when they attempted to abandon ranks and simply rename diplomats 
polpred, it was diffi cult for a diplomat of a lesser status to receive an 
audience with a more senior foreign offi cial.27 The situation, Litvinov 
goes on to say, was little better at the lower levels of diplomatic staffi ng 
with the following unfi lled posts: ‘9 for counsellors, 22 for secretaries, 
30 for consuls and vice-consuls and 46 for the other political posts 
in embassies (heads of press department, attachés and secretaries of 
consulates).’28
Litvinov clearly felt that the purge of the Narkomindel and the pro-
blems it engendered were grave indeed. Even the processes that the 
Central Committee had set in motion to monitor diplomats, notably 
bringing them back to Moscow every six to eight months, were diffi cult 
to follow because of a lack of suitable personnel in embassies.29 
The problems, however, were not limited to the foreign missions 
or the diplomatic staff. Technical offi cials were lacking, meaning 
that the Narkomindel was struggling with administration and with 
communi cations.
Litvinov’s letter shows the hand of the NKVD, and the ways in 
which they were restricting his organization, although he takes care not 
to be overly critical of those responsible for conducting the purge of his 
commissariat. In this Litvinov shows the difference in political climate 
from when his predecessor, Georgii Chicherin, had criticized the 
OGPU for hampering the operations of the Narkomindel.30 The 
NKVD held sway over the Narkomindel, as its permission was needed 
for individuals to serve abroad, and this, according to the letter, was 
not granted to as many individuals as Litvinov and the Narkomindel 
would have liked. Litvinov’s letter suggests that he felt that the NKVD 
was partially to blame for hampering his agency. He implored Stalin 
to intervene and restore some means for him to replace offi cials who 
had been removed as a result of the purges.
26 Ibid.
27 Armstrong, ‘The Diplomacy of Revolutionary States’, p. 53; Craig and Gilbert, The 
Diplomats, pp. 242–23. Polpred means plenipotentiary representative and is a contraction of 
polmochnyi predstavitel´.
28 Litvinov to Stalin, 3 January 1939.
29 Politburo decision, 28 February 1938, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 996, as quoted in 
Sabine Dullin ‘Litvinov and the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs’, pp. 137–38.
30 Sokolov, ‘Posledniaia sluzhebnaia zapiska G. V. Chicherina’, p. 108.
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The letter not only gives an impression of what Litvinov believed to 
be the motives behind the purge of many Narkomindel offi cials, but 
also indicates that the problem went deeper than the disappearance of 
individuals. From his comments, it appears that there was a complete 
deadlock on moving new staff into the Narkomindel to replace those 
whom the purge had claimed. The problem in this respect was, in part, 
created by the NKVD and the Central Committee refusing to give, 
and in some cases rescinding, clearance for individuals to work abroad 
or with secret documents, and partially by the diffi culty of fi nding 
suitable candidates to replace those lost in the purge. This was com-
pounded by the purging of individuals who had not even begun their 
service, and by problems of recruiting and training new staff, which 
Litvinov deemed impossible without a change in the ‘attitude’ of the 
NKVD and the Central Committee. The letter, as a whole, is a plea 
from Litvinov that Stalin recognize that the purge of the Narkomindel 
was extremely problematic for the organization, and for the conduct of 
Soviet diplomacy. 
The purges went beyond the removal of individual diplomats and 
Narkomindel offi cials, also restricting the Narkomindel’s work, both 
practically and as a result of the climate of fear. US diplomats com-
plained that their Soviet counterparts became impossible to talk to, and 
that they were unwilling to give any information, as they were so afraid 
of making errors for which they would be severely punished.31 Internal 
channels of communication were harmed as the courier service became 
impotent, and certain embassies lacked technicians to operate telegraph 
equipment.32
Shortly before his defection in 1937, Aleksandr Grigor´evich Barmin, 
who held the post of chargé d’affaires in Athens, observed that he 
found the Narkomindel in ‘a strange torpor’, having received no instruc-
tions for several months.33 Barmin remembered that the purges were 
not discussed within the Greek mission, and the terror process reduced 
the Narkomindel and the diplomatic corps to the position of silent sup-
plicants. So great was the fear of being recalled that Soviet diplomats 
began to be perceived as unwilling to make decisions and not to be 
trusted to convey accurately information to Moscow.34 The Terror 
paralysed the Narkomindel into a silent and ineffective organization, 
a far cry from what it had been previously in the decade, and left it 
bereft of offi cials in senior posts.
31 Henderson to Secretary of State, 10 June 1937, 861.00/11705, in FRUS: Soviet Union, 
1933–1939, p. 380.
32 Litvinov to Stalin, 3 January 1939.
33 Barmin, One Who Survived, p. 3.
34 Henderson to Secretary of State, 10 June 1937, 861.00/11705, in FRUS: Soviet Union, 
1933–1939, p. 380.
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The letter also highlights the visibility of the purges and the with-
drawal of the Soviet Union from international society. Since diplomats 
occupied high-profi le positions which brought them into contact with 
foreign political offi cials, the effects of the purge must have been highl y 
obvious as Soviet diplomats began to be swallowed up by the purge 
and their posts left vacant. In this respect, the purge of the Narko-
mindel is similar to that of the offi cer corps of the army.35 The 
Narkomindel felt a strong need to limit the visibility of the purge; after 
1936 it ceased to publish the annual volume it had published since 1925 
in the form of Ezhegodnik NKID/Annuaire Diplomatique. This move was 
clearly a step to avoid embarrassment, as the lists of offi cials included 
within the volumes began to read more like a casualty list than a list of 
where various Soviet offi cials were serving.36 As the Ezhegodnik was a 
publication from the organization itself, rather than from the central 
government, one can see the Narkomindel’s move in stopping its pub-
lication as a clear step to limit damage to Soviet prestige abroad during 
the purge era. Also telling is the removal of purged diplomats from the 
pages of history. Diplomaticheskii slovar´ in its fi rst edition in 1948 contains 
none of the purged diplomats. Some appear in the second edition 
(1960–64), a few more in the third (1971), but many were only added 
in the appendix of the 1984–86 edition, following their rehabili tation.37 
Additionally, the names of some of the more prominent diplomats who 
fell victim to the purge were removed from Dokumenty vneshnei politiki 
SSSR.38 
Despite the NKVD’s grip on the Narkomindel, Litvinov sought 
to limit the purge of the diplomatic corps to the extent of his ability. 
This was not always easy, and his approach to the purges was largely 
based on prudence, probably to an extent as a result of institutional 
self-interest lest he be seen to be protecting individuals during the 
period. He was present at the Central Committee’s plenums, which 
met to decide the fate of accused individuals, invariably voting with 
the majority for expulsion from the Party and passing the case on to 
the NKVD. He worked with the Central Committee, seeking approval 
for individuals to serve overseas or to accompany him to assemblies 
35 Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism, London, 1971 
(hereafter, Let History Judge), ch. 6.
36 USSR. Narodnyi komissariat po inostrannym delam, Ezhegodnik Narodnogo komissariata 
po inostrannym delam: Annuaire diplomatique du Comissariat du peuple pour les affaires étrangères, 12 
vols, Moscow, 1925–36 (hereafter, Ezhegodnik Narodnogo komissariata).
37 A. Ia. Vyshinskii and S. A. Lozovskii (eds), Diplomaticheskii slovar´, 2 vols, Moscow, 1948 
(hereafter, Diplomaticheskii slovar´, 1948); A. A. Gromyko, I. N. Zemskov, V. M. Khvostov, 
Diplomaticheskii slovar´, 3 vols, Moscow, 1960–64; A. A. Gromyko, S. A. Golunskii and V. M. 
Khvostov (eds), Diplomaticheskii slovar´, 3 vols, Moscow, 1985–87 (hereafter, Diplomaticheskii 
slovar´, 1985–87).
38 Uldricks, ‘Impact of the Great Purges’, p. 188.
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of the League of Nations.39 Litvinov was being extremely cautious, 
following the direction that the Central Committee had chosen in the 
late 1930s. 
Litvinov continued to place Soviet diplomatic goals above ideo logical 
concerns during the purge era, as he had done before, continuing to 
show that engagement in diplomacy was more important to him than 
ideology. When the Central Committee tried to recall Boris Efi movich 
Shtein, Ambassador in Rome, Litvinov told him on several occasions, 
‘you are needed in Rome, forbidden to come back’.40 In part moti-
vated by the need to maintain diplomatic contact in capitals across 
Europe in the late 1930s, Litvinov was attempting to preserve the 
Narkomindel and to keep Soviet diplomacy functioning effectively. On 
occasion he showed his open disagreement with the Central Committe e. 
When the Central Committee denounced Rykov and Bukharin, Lit-
vinov refused to engage in condemning them.41 Litvinov was concerned 
that the accusations should be credible, and in this showed the refl ex 
of a diplomat concerned about the Soviet Union’s image abroad. That 
the Soviet Union’s image abroad during the purges was important to 
diplomats is demonstrated by the fact that Litvinov was not the only 
senior diplomat who attempted to restrict the purge in the Narko-
mindel. Vladimir Potemkin, appointed Deputy Foreign Com missar in 
1937, also questioned the Central Committee’s decisions. In March 
1938 he requested a review of the decision against Fedor Semenovich 
Veinberg, whose departure from the Western Department he feared 
would be catastrophic, both because of his abilities and his standing in 
the international community.42
39 Expulsion from the party of Rudzutak and Tukhashevskii, 24 May, of Iakir and Ubore-
vich, 30 May 1937, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 615, as quoted in Dullin, ‘Litvinov and the 
People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs’, p. 140; Expulsion of Postyshev, 28 February–2 
March 1938; expulsion of Egorov, 9–11 January 1939, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 640, as 
quoted in ibid., p. 140; Letter from Litvinov to Kaganovich, 20 August 1936, AVP RF, f.  05, 
op. 16, p. 114, d. 1, as quoted in ibid.; Letter from Litvinov to Stalin, 5 February 1937, AVP 
RF, f. 05, op. 17, p. 126, d. 1, as quoted in ibid.; telegram from Kaganovich to Stalin, 
26 August 1936, RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 93, l. 11, reproduced in Oleg Khlevniyuk 
et al. (eds), Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepiska 1931–1936 gg., Moscow, 2001, p. 647; letter from 
Kaga novich to Stalin, 27 August 1936, RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 93, l. 115, reproduced in 
ibid., p. 650; Letter from Kaganovich and Molotov to Stalin, 9 September 1936, RGASPI, 
f. 558, op. 11, d. 94, l. 80, reproduced in ibid., p. 670.
40 Zinov´ev Sheinis, ‘Sud´ba Diplomata. Shtrikhi k portretu Borisa Shteina’, in N. V. 
Popov (ed.), Arkhivy raskryvaiut tainy. . . : Mezhdunarodnye voprosy: sobitiia i liudi, Moscow, 2001, 
p.  301.
41 ‘Materialy fevralsko-martovskogo plenuma TsK VKP(b) 1937 goda’, Voprosy istorii, 1992, 
2–3, pp. 3–4; 4–5, 3–36; 5–6, 3–29.
42 Letter from Potemkin to Andreev, 15 March 1938, AVP RF, f. 05, op. 18, p. 138, d. 3, 
as quoted in Dullin, Des hommes d’infl uence, p. 243. Fedor Semyonovich Veinberg was 
Deputy Director (1935–37), and then Director (1937–38), of the Narkomindel’s Third 
Western Department.
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Some consideration of the extent of the purge in the Narkomindel 
must be made if its full impact on Soviet diplomacy is to be understood. 
It is hard to ascertain from available information the full scale of the 
purge in the Narkomindel, but it seems, according to Uldricks’s work 
in the late 1970s and Dullin’s more recent study, that at least 34 per 
cent of its offi cials were dismissed. For those holding ‘responsible’ posts 
(approxi mately 100 individuals) the fi gures are twice as high; 62 per 
cent fell victim while 16 per cent maintained their posts, and 14 per 
cent escaped the purge by dying other than in the purges, or through 
defection. For 8 per cent there is insuffi cient information to conclude 
whether they suffered in the purge or not.43 
The fi gures are even higher if one takes only those who held posi-
tions in which they were in charge of a department or embassy. The 
extent to which senior offi cials and ambassadors perished is easier to 
ascertain as a result of their higher prominence. From the upper levels 
of the central bureaucracy, of the twenty-eight senior offi cials, the For-
eign Commissar and his deputies and chiefs of departments, seven were 
shot, two were relieved of their posts, six were arrested, there are nine 
on whose fates there is no information, and four survived including 
Litvinov. Of the thirty-six individuals who held ambassadorial (includ-
ing chargé d’affaires in the absence of an ambassador) posts in Europe 
between 1936 and 1939, nine were recalled from their posts, six were 
shot, one died in offi ce, one defected, one was arrested, and nineteen 
survived. From an aggregate of these together, for those who directed 
embassies or departments we have a total of sixty-fi ve (Georgii 
Aleksandrovich Astakhov was appointed from the central Narkomin-
del to be chargé d’affaires in Berlin during the purges), at least half of 
whom were victims of the purge in some form. From this it can be seen 
that the risk of falling victim to the purge was proportionally greater 
with seniority within the Narkomindel. The table and charts show the 
relative percentages of senior individuals purged in the Narkomindel.
The table below takes into account the individuals’ fates on leaving 
the Narkomindel, except in the cases where they were arrested and 
subsequently shot. Some were arrested later, and Raskolnikov defected 
after being recalled from his post.44 
43 Uldricks, ‘Impact of the Great Purges’, p. 190; Dullin, Des hommes d’infl uence, p. 240.
44 Sources for this analysis are L. S. Eremina and A. B. Roginskii (eds), Rasstrelnye spiski: 
Moscow, 1937–1941; ‘Kommunarka’, Butovo: kniga pamiati zhertv politicheskikh repressii, Moscow, 
2000; Ezhegodnik Narodnogo komissariata; Diplomaticheskii slovar´, 1948; Diplomaticheskii slovar´, 
1985–87; Uldricks, ‘The Impact of the Great Purges’, pp. 190–91; Dullin, Des hommes 
d’infl uence, pp. 334–38.
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Table 1. Fate of upper-level Narkomindel offi cials and ambassadors in the purge
Fate Upper level offi cials Ambassadors
Shot N. I. Krestinskii (a. June 1937, 
s. March 1938)
B. S. Stomoniakov 
(r. summer 1938, a. Dec 1938, 
s. Oct 1941)
P. S. Nazarov (a. May 1939, 
s. July 41) 
G. N. Laskevich (a. Nov 1937, 
s. Aug 1938)
A. F. Neuman (a. Aug 1937, 
s. Apr 1938)
A. V. Sabanin (a. Sept 1937, 
s. Aug 1938)
M. A. Plotkin (a. May 1939, 
s. July 1941)
K. K. Iurenev (Germany) 
(a. Sept 1937, s. Aug 1938)
E. A. Asmus (Finland) 
(a. Aug 1937, s. Dec 1937)
A. A. Bekzadian (Hungary) 
(a. Nov 1937, s. Aug 1938)
B. G. Podolskii (Lithuania) 
(a. Nov 1937, s. July 1938)
Y. K. Davtian (Poland) 
(a. Nov 1937, s. July 1938)
L. M. Karkahan (Turkey) 
(a. June 1937, s. Dec 1937)
Relieved/
recalled
E. E. Herschelmann 
(Dec 1937)
B. M. Mironov (Aug 1937)
A. F. Merekalov (Germany) 
(May 1939)
F. F. Raskol´nikov (Bulgaria) 
(Dec 1937, d. April 1938)
N. S. Tikhmenev (Denmark) 
(Dec 1937)
M. I. Rosenberg (Spain) 
(Dec 1937)
M. V. Kobetskii (Greece) (1937)
S. J. Brodovskii (Latvia) 
(Oct 1937)
I. S. Iakubovich (Norway) 
(1937)
M. S. Ostrovskii (Romania) 
(Dec 1937)
B. E. Shtein (Italy) (Feb 1939)
Arrested V. N. Barkov (May 1939)
A. V. Fekhner (Aug 1937)
D. G. Stern (June 1937)
F. S. Veinberg (May 1939)
S. I. Vinogradov (May 1939)
E. A. Gnedin (May 1939)
Y. S. Podolskii (Austria) 
(Nov 1937)
Defected F. K. Butenko (Romania) 
(Feb 1938)
Died in 
offi ce
A. M. Ustinov (Estonia) 
(Nov 1937)
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Table 1. Continued
Fate Upper level offi cials Ambassadors
No 
information
Y. M. Kozlovski
V. V. Egoriev
N. E. Rivlina
L. E. Berejov
G. Y. Bejanov
Y. S. Ilinskii
V. L. Levin
B. D. Rosenblum
J. M. Morsthein
Key: a – arrested; r – recalled or relieved; s – shot.
Figure 1: Effects of the purges of senior offi cials in the central Narkomindel
Figure 2: Effects of the purges on those holding Ambassadorial posts 
1936–39
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As the reshaping of the Narkomindel progressed, the effect on 
diplomats serving abroad is important, as are their reactions. How 
concerned were they for their own safety, how did they explain the 
purges, and how did they represent the Soviet state at the time? 
Public support for the purges was the manner in which some Soviet 
diplomats chose to behave. While this showed the regime that they 
were loyal, on the basis of the numbers purged it does not appear to 
have been a good way to avoid being swept up in the purges. It also 
had the additional dimension of alienating foreign diplomats and even 
relatively pro-Soviet public opinion as individuals found the purges 
abhorrent and unjust.45 Vociferous support of the purges was not, 
therefore, a universal approach, nor one that could be deemed to guar-
antee security. It also had the effect of making the individual appear to 
the international community to agree with what was going on within 
the Soviet Union, creating further problems for them in the conduct of 
diplomacy.
One approach, adopted by Alexandra Kollontai, was silence and 
withdrawal. Kollontai’s appointment books detail her meetings with 
foreign diplomats and attendance at social occasions. During 1938 she 
was much more reserved than previously, the appointment book being 
45 I. Maiskii, B. Shou i drugie: vospominaniia, Moscow, 1967, pp. 82–83; ‘Memorandum by 
the Second Secretary of the Embassy in the Soviet Union (Kennan)’, 861.00/11675, 
13 February 1937, reproduced in FRUS: Soviet Union, 1933–39, pp. 362–69; Uldricks, ‘The 
Impact of the Great Purges’, p. 189.
Figure 3: Aggregate effect of the purges on Department Chiefs and 
Ambassadorial posts (100%=65)
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half the size from the previous four years, and it is clear that Kollontai 
dropped out of the active diplomatic circle during 1938. During the 
fi rst show trial in 1936 her diary writing, which was otherwise almost 
religiously frequent, stopped for nine months.46 One reason for this was 
the damage that the purge and the Terror had done to the Soviet 
Union’s international image — Kollontai found that problems arose in 
her interactions with other diplomats.47 Her solution seems to have 
been deliberately to disengage from the diplomatic milieu and remain 
silent about the atrocities of the purge years in the Soviet Union. For 
her, at least, silence was the best way to respond to what was happen-
ing, as she felt unable to support it. There was a precedent for such 
behaviour: she had shunned German diplomats after 1933, refusing 
to acknowledge their presence at functions or to receive them at the 
embassy. For Kollontai, silence and withdrawal were the best policy 
when dealing with matters for which she had no taste and which she 
could not comprehend. 
The silence of diplomats such as Kollontai on the purges was also 
a means of disengaging from aspects of Soviet society, as well as diplo-
matic circles. By not engaging in the discourse surrounding the purges 
there was no way to give affi rmation to the regime, as one might 
by ‘speaking Bolshevik’ and becoming a carrier of the regime’s dis-
course.48 Silence on an issue, therefore, was a form of anti-Stalinist 
behaviour, particularly powerful when translated to the representation 
of the Soviet Union outside its borders. Diplomats had been made 
complicit with the purges by having to justify them and by providing 
information to aid the process, and silence was a means of undoing this. 
While silence was a weaker form of protest — compared to speaking 
out against the purges — in the context of the era a diplomat who 
failed to take the party line risked his or her life, and so silence 
presented itself as a better option.
Another option, taken by only a few, was to defect. This was a stark 
way of displaying a lack of support for the purges, as well as being a 
tactic for self-preservation. In any event, the regime saw defection as a 
threat to security and took steps to limit its impact on the Soviet Union’s 
46 Kniga zapisenii iubileinikh dat, visitov, obedy, priemov Kollontai: Diplomaticheskikh, 
politicheskikh, gosudarstvenikh i drugikh deyatelei Shvetsii i poslov raznikh stran v Shvetsii 
i drugie, 1934–39, RGASPI, f. 134, op. 3, d. 59–64, 67; Alexandra Kollontai, Diplomaticheskie 
dnevniki: 1922–1940, Moscow, 2001, vol. 2; Diplomaticheskie zapiski, tetrad´ trinadtsataya, 
RGASPI, f. 134, op. 3, d. 25.
47 Swedish Press Bulletin no. 3, 7 January 1935, AVP RF, f. 140, op. 19, p. 27, d. 3, 
ll. 15–16; Barbara Evans Clements, Bolshevik Feminist: The Life of Aleksandra Kollontai, 
Bloomington, IN and London, 1979, p. 252.
48 Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization, Berkeley, CA and London, 
1995, ch. 5; Jochen Hellbeck, ‘Speaking Out: Languages of Affi rmation and Dissent in 
Stalinist Russia’, Kritika, 1, 2000, 1, pp. 71–96.
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international image. The small number of defectors suggests that the 
steps to limit defection were fairly successful, although another factor 
must surely have been that it was not necessarily a strategy for avoiding 
the reach of the NKVD, despite Alexandr Barmin’s successful fl ight on 
the night he believed he was to be kidnapped.49 Fedor Butenko simi-
larly escaped to join a fascist group in Italy, although it was initially 
claimed that he had been assassinated.50 Not all were so fortunate, 
however, with Fedor Fedorovich Raskol´nikov’s death in Paris, alleg-
edly in suspicious circumstances, following his refusal to return to 
Moscow and defection.51 Defection was not, from what can be seen 
in its few instances, a particularly viable option, although it remains 
unclear how many diplomats may have been apprehended in the 
process.
There were changes not just for those who already served in the 
Narkomindel at the outbreak of the purges. In addition to the diplo-
mats accused and killed, the wave of terror had another dimension 
which seriously harmed the Narkomindel. Diplomats removed during 
the purges were replaced by individuals who lacked the experience or 
aptitude to function effectively as diplomats. Individuals from outside 
the Narkomindel stepped into vacant ambassadorial posts, as well as 
more minor offi cial positions.52 Replacements for diplomats removed 
during the purges came from two main sources. The fi rst of these 
sources was the lower levels of the Narkomindel, from which offi cials 
moved up into positions vacated higher in the hierarchy. The second 
source was other commissariats. 
This replacement strategy seems to have been a deliberate policy on 
the part of Stalin and Molotov in the late 1930s as a means of further 
drawing power away from the Narkomindel and centralizing it. It can 
be seen in the second wave of purges which swept through the Narko-
mindel between May and July 1939, following Litvinov’s dismissal as 
Foreign Commissar in May 1939.53 Molotov systematically removed 
almost all of the personnel who had served in the Chicherin and Lit-
vinov eras. One of the fi rst to go was Korzhenko, who had been brought 
49 Barmin, One Who Survived, pp. 12–16.
50 Izvestia, 10 February 1938, cited in Dullin, Des hommes d’infl uence, pp. 256–57; Declaration 
from Litvinov to the Romanian Government, 17 February 1938, published in Izvestia, 18 
February 1938, cited in ibid., p. 257.
51 Dullin, Des hommes d’infl uence, p. 21; Medvedev, Let History Judge, p. 795.
52 Litvinov to Stalin, 3 January 1939.
53 For more on Litvinov’s decline, see Albert Resis, ‘The Fall of Litvinov, Harbinger 
of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact’, Europe-Asia Studies, 52, 2000, 1, pp. 33–57; 
Geoffrey Roberts, ‘The Fall of Litvinov: A Revisionist View’, Journal of Contemporary History, 
27, 1992, 4, pp. 639–57; Dullin, ‘Litvinov and the People’s Commissariat of Foreign 
Affairs’.
108 the  sov iet  d i plomat ic  corp s  &  s tal in ’ s  purge s
in to direct the purge of the Narkomindel.54 US diplomats reported 
that Molotov replaced ‘almost the entire staff’, including all but two of 
the department heads and more than 90 per cent of the minor offi -
cials.55 Foreigners saw this as being entirely motivated by increasing 
centralization in foreign affairs as a result of Molotov’s appointment 
and hence a desire to remove every individual connected to the 
Litvinov administration.56 It appears that Stalin and Molotov were 
attempting to destroy all remnants of the Narkomindel’s auto nomy, to 
fi ll it with inexperienced individuals (most of whom had never had any 
contact with foreigners), and to concentrate all of the power in Soviet 
foreign affairs in the hands of the central government. 
The purge of the Narkomindel removed diplomats from diplomatic 
activity not only physically but also psychologically, making them 
unable to present themselves in it effectively because they were too 
frightened, or obliged to stay silent on the horrors happening in the 
Soviet Union. A new generation of diplomats unable to function in 
diplomacy, coupled with the ravages of the purges, destroyed the 
Narko mindel, and Soviet diplomacy was reshaped to the point that 
comp liance with the rules of Stalinist society took priority over 
integration into the diplomatic milieu. 
The purges also hampered decision-making in Soviet foreign policy 
since they caused Soviet diplomats to be pushed out of diplomatic rela-
tions with foreign powers. Other states viewed the purges with some 
distaste, and came to question whether they wished to be involved 
diplomatically with the Stalinist regime, particularly as Soviet diplo-
mats were no longer considered to be reliable. In addition to this, the 
purge of the Soviet High Command led Britain and France seriously 
to doubt the Soviet Union’s ability to fi ght a war with Germany, 
severely hampering Litvinov’s drive for collective security.57 That the 
Soviet Union was not involved at Munich in 1938 shows the culmi-
nation of doubts as to whether the Soviets could be trusted to honour 
their agreements. This severely restricted Soviet foreign policy options 
as the chances of containing Germany through a tripartite alliance with 
Britain and France looked bleak. It was surely becoming increasingly 
clear to the Narkomindel that Britain and France were not interested 
in collective security and in including the Soviets in a treaty against 
Hitler, but were rather leaving them to fend for themselves.58 In this 
54 Murray, I Spied for Stalin, p. 126.
55 Telegram from Grummon to Secretary of State no.  861.021/46, 6 July 1939, 
reproduced in FRUS: Soviet Union, 1933–1939, pp. 770–73.
56 Ibid., p. 772.
57 Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Russia and the World 1917–1991, London and New York, 1997, 
pp. 42–43.
58 W. P. Coates and Zelda Coates, A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations, pp. 590–600; Daily 
Telegraph, 5 December 1938 as quoted in ibid., p. 600; Phillips, Between the Revolution and the 
West, pp. 160–64.
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way the purges can be seen to have shaped Soviet diplomacy in the 
late 1930s not just in the way it shaped the diplomatic corps and 
the ways in which diplomats were able to behave, but also in terms 
of the options that remained open to the Soviet Union in its foreign 
policy. The policy of collective security espoused by Litvinov proved 
unworkable in the face of the purges, and ultimately the only option 
that remained for the Soviet Union to maintain security in the coming 
war was to conclude a pact with Nazi Germany.
Effectively crippling the Narkomindel, the purges were at least in 
part the regime’s reaction to a political agency with too much inde-
pendence and contact with the outside world. While many diplomats 
before 1936 had had great experience of the world beyond the confi nes 
of the Soviet Union, many new appointees in the latter half of the 
decade had never travelled abroad. The purge of the Narkomindel, 
while fi tting into a broader regime policy, was specifi cally designed 
to curb the independence of Soviet diplomats and the Narkomindel, 
and to bring it under the control of the central government. In this 
light, Molotov’s appointment as Foreign Commissar in 1939 was 
clearly orches trated to ensure that Stalin had complete control over 
the Narkomindel.
The Narkomindel was drastically affected by the purges. After 1936 
there was a signifi cant change in Soviet diplomacy, this time imposed 
by the regime’s behaviour rather than as a response to external factors 
governing integration into diplomatic society that the Soviets had been 
unable to change during the 1920s and early 1930s. As paranoia regar-
ding Soviet citizens’ contact with foreigners rose, so the Narkomindel 
and its diplomats were withdrawn from the diplomatic fi eld. Personnel 
and apparatus were removed and not replaced as consulates were 
closed and the purge swept through the Narkomindel, limiting Soviet 
engagement in diplomacy. Diplomats, however, remained committed 
to furthering the Soviet Union’s diplomatic efforts and were unhappy 
at the regime’s actions which led to the retreat from international 
diplomatic society as consulates were closed and vacancies created by 
the purges were left unfi lled.
The purges had other implications for Soviet diplomacy. Obliged to 
represent the Soviet Union abroad, Soviet diplomats were forced to 
explain and legitimize the purges to foreigners. Some responded by 
publicly supporting the purges, while others chose to remain silent. 
Soviet diplomats, like their counterparts everywhere, needed to repre-
sent their country in a positive light, and it is clear that the purges 
restricted their ability to do this effectively.
At home the situation was also problematic. Litvinov made some 
bold attempts to limit the damage the purge of the Narkomindel had 
on Soviet diplomacy, although he was powerless to stop the NKVD 
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from going about its tasks and was obliged to look on as his agency was 
rendered impotent and many of the offi cials of the Narkomindel’s for-
mative years were consumed by the purges. Late in the day, perhaps 
too late, he tried to appeal to Stalin on the grounds of the harm that 
was being done to Soviet diplomacy, but with little success. 
For the Narkomindel and its diplomats, the purges brought the era 
of relatively ‘normal’ diplomatic engagement and culture to an end. 
With the dismissal of Litvinov in May 1939 Stalin had broken Litvinov’s 
Commissariat and rendered Soviet diplomats effectively impotent in 
international affairs. This clearly did not go unnoticed on the inter-
national stage, and had an impact on Soviet prestige as well as the 
regard in which its remaining diplomats were held. Ultimately, the 
purges resulted in an ending of traditional diplomacy for the Soviet 
Union, as heads of state moved to meet directly with Stalin in pre-
ference to dealing with ineffective diplomats, leading to the summitry 
of the Second World War and the Cold War.
